One critical flaw of voting is its susceptibility to strategic manipulations. That is, agents may have an incentive to misreport their preferences (i.e.

Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While iterative plurality has been shown to only return alternatives with at most one less initial votes than the truthful winner, it is less understood how agents' welfare changes in equilibrium. To this end, we differentiate agents' utility from their manipulation mechanism and determine iterative plurality's ADPoA in the worst-and average-cases. We first prove that the worst-case ADPoA is linear in the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we study the average-case ADPoA and prove that equilibrium winners have a constant order welfare advantage over the truthful winner in expectation. Our positive results illustrate the prospect for social welfare to increase due to strategic manipulation.

Strategic classification~(SC) explores how individuals or entities modify their features strategically to achieve favorable classification outcomes. However, existing SC methods, which are largely based on linear models or shallow neural networks, face significant limitations in terms of scalability and capacity when applied to real-world datasets with significantly increasing scale, especially in financial services and the internet sector. In this paper, we investigate how to leverage large language models to design a more scalable and efficient SC framework, especially in the case of growing individuals engaged with decision-making processes. Specifically, we introduce GLIM, a gradient-free SC method grounded in in-context learning. During the feed-forward process of self-attention, GLIM implicitly simulates the typical bi-level optimization process of SC, including both the feature manipulation and decision rule optimization. Without fine-tuning the LLMs, our proposed GLIM enjoys the advantage of cost-effective adaptation in dynamic strategic environments. Theoretically, we prove GLIM can support pre-trained LLMs to adapt to a broad range of strategic manipulations. We validate our approach through experiments with a collection of pre-trained LLMs on real-world and synthetic datasets in financial and internet domains, demonstrating that our GLIM exhibits both robustness and efficiency, and offering an effective solution for large-scale SC tasks.

We study evaluation of AI systems without ground truth by exploiting a link between strategic gaming and information loss. We analyze which information-theoretic mechanisms resist adversarial manipulation, extending finite-sample bounds to show that bounded f-divergences (e.g., total variation distance) maintain polynomial guarantees under attacks while unbounded measures (e.g., KL divergence) degrade exponentially. To implement these mechanisms, we model the overseer as an agent and characterize incentive-compatible scoring rules as f-mutual information objectives. Under adversarial attacks, TVD-MI maintains effectiveness (area under curve 0.70-0.77) while traditional judge queries are near change (AUC $\approx$ 0.50), demonstrating that querying the same LLM for information relationships rather than quality judgments provides both theoretical and practical robustness. The mechanisms decompose pairwise evaluations into reliable item-level quality scores without ground truth, addressing a key limitation of traditional peer prediction. We release preregistration and code.

Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While iterative plurality has been shown to only return alternatives with at most one less initial votes than the truthful winner, it is less understood how agents' welfare changes in equilibrium. To this end, we differentiate agents' utility from their manipulation mechanism and determine iterative plurality's ADPoA in the worst-and average-cases. We first prove that the worst-case ADPoA is linear in the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we study the average-case ADPoA and prove that equilibrium winners have a constant order welfare advantage over the truthful winner in expectation. Our positive results illustrate the prospect for social welfare to increase due to strategic manipulation.

Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While iterative plurality has been shown to only return alternatives with at most one less initial votes than the truthful winner, it is less understood how agents' welfare changes in equilibrium. To this end, we differentiate agents' utility from their manipulation mechanism and determine iterative plurality's ADPoA in the worst- and average-cases. We first prove that the worst-case ADPoA is linear in the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we study the average-case ADPoA and prove that equilibrium winners have a constant order welfare advantage over the truthful winner in expectation.

Machine learning systems have been widely used to make decisions about individuals who may best respond and behave strategically to receive favorable outcomes, e.g., they may genuinely improve the true labels or manipulate observable features directly to game the system without changing labels. Although both behaviors have been studied (often as two separate problems) in the literature, most works assume individuals can (i) perfectly foresee the outcomes of their behaviors when they best respond; (ii) change their features arbitrarily as long as it is affordable, and the costs they need to pay are deterministic functions of feature changes. In this paper, we consider a different setting and focus on imitative strategic behaviors with unforeseeable outcomes, i.e., individuals manipulate/improve by imitating the features of those with positive labels, but the induced feature changes are unforeseeable. We first propose a Stackelberg game to model the interplay between individuals and the decision-maker, under which we examine how the decision-maker's ability to anticipate individual behavior affects its objective function and the individual's best response. We show that the objective difference between the two can be decomposed into three interpretable terms, with each representing the decision-maker's preference for a certain behavior. By exploring the roles of each term, we further illustrate how a decision-maker with adjusted preferences can simultaneously disincentivize manipulation, incentivize improvement, and promote fairness.

In real-world classification settings, such as loan application evaluation or content moderation on online platforms, individuals respond to classifier predictions by strategically updating their features to increase their likelihood of receiving a particular (positive) decision (at a certain cost). Yet, when different demographic groups have different feature distributions or pay different update costs, prior work has shown that individuals from minority groups often pay a higher cost to update their features. Fair classification aims to address such classifier performance disparities by constraining the classifiers to satisfy statistical fairness properties. However, we show that standard fairness constraints do not guarantee that the constrained classifier reduces the disparity in strategic manipulation cost. To address such biases in strategic settings and provide equal opportunities for strategic manipulation, we propose a constrained optimization framework that constructs classifiers that lower the strategic manipulation cost for minority groups. We develop our framework by studying theoretical connections between group-specific strategic cost disparity and standard selection rate fairness metrics (e.g., statistical rate and true positive rate). Empirically, we show the efficacy of this approach over multiple real-world datasets.

Recent work in iterative voting has defined the additive dynamic price of anarchy (ADPoA) as the difference in social welfare between the truthful and worst-case equilibrium profiles resulting from repeated strategic manipulations. While iterative plurality has been shown to only return alternatives with at most one less initial votes than the truthful winner, it is less understood how agents' welfare changes in equilibrium. To this end, we differentiate agents' utility from their manipulation mechanism and determine iterative plurality's ADPoA in the worst- and average-cases. We first prove that the worst-case ADPoA is linear in the number of agents. To overcome this negative result, we study the average-case ADPoA and prove that equilibrium winners have a constant order welfare advantage over the truthful winner in expectation. Our positive results illustrate the prospect for social welfare to increase due to strategic manipulation.

We study the problem of combinatorial multi-armed bandits (CMAB) under strategic manipulations of rewards, where each arm can modify the emitted reward signals for its own interest. Our setting elaborates a more realistic model of adaptive arms that imposes relaxed assumptions compared to adversarial corruptions and adversarial attacks. Algorithms designed under strategic arms gain robustness in real applications while avoiding being overcautious and hampering the performance. We bridge the gap between strategic manipulations and adversarial attacks by investigating the optimal colluding strategy among arms under the MAB problem. We then propose a strategic variant of the combinatorial UCB algorithm, which has a regret of at most $O(m\log T + m B_{max})$ under strategic manipulations, where $T$ is the time horizon, $m$ is the number of arms, and $B_{max}$ is the maximum budget. We further provide lower bounds on the strategic budgets for attackers to incur certain regret of the bandit algorithm. Extensive experiments corroborate our theoretical findings on robustness and regret bounds, in a variety of regimes of manipulation budgets.